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Abstract: 
Hate speech legislation involves a fundamental conflict with the right to freedom of expression. However, 
it is a conflict that can be justified in a constitutional framework in which free speech is not paramount 
and can be balanced against other rights and freedoms. This paper discusses the concept of “hate 
speech” legislation, the conflict between freedom of expression and hate speech censorship, and ways in 
which these seemingly-incompatible concepts might be harmonised. It considers, drawing on legislation 
and case law from other jurisdictions, and in light of the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment 
Act 2013, the possibility of extending such legislation to protect gender and sexual minorities in 
New Zealand, and suggests a potential framework for such legislative change.  
 
Any provision concerning hate speech must avoid overreaching into the realm of free expression. As a 
result, ‘hate speech’ should be clearly defined and narrowly focussed in scope, as words or matter which 
“exposes or tends to expose to hatred or contempt” the minority group at which the protection is aimed. 
In New Zealand’s constitutional/rights framework, this limitation on freedom of expression can be 
justified as reasonable and appropriate. While hate speech legislation does create a conflict with freedom 
of expression, to protect hate speech at the risk of perpetuating harm, discrimination, marginalisation and 
silencing is not appropriate. It sends the message that the voice of hate speakers is worth more than that 
of minorities, and undervalues the dignity and social assurance of those minority groups as valued 
members of society. 
 
 
This paper comprises 12,000 words not including the abstract, contents, bibliography or appendices. 
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I Introduction 
 
“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”
1  
 
This axiom illustrates a liberal approach to freedom of expression, a fundamental 
underpinning of a free society. When a citizen exercises that freedom to advocate for 
denying rights, dignity, respect, or life, however, should that expression still be 
protected within the law? Expecting vulnerable minorities to stoically accept the impact 
of hate speech, in the quest for untrammelled free expression, may perpetuate 
marginalisation and discrimination. 
 
In this paper I discuss the concept of ‘hate speech’ legislation, the conflict between 
freedom of expression and hate speech censorship, and ways in which these seemingly-
incompatible concepts might be harmonised. What is considered ‘hate speech’ is a 
subject of much discussion in different jurisdictions and among differing academic 
perspectives, and this paper will expand upon these different conceptions and 
definitions. However, it is useful at the outset to establish a general definition of the 
term, as it will be used extensively. Hate speech goes further than unpleasant speech 
which might cause offence or hurt feelings. ‘Hate speech’ is therefore used as a general 
term to cover the type of expression that can be variously described as ‘vilification’, 
‘exposing to hatred’, ‘expressing serious contempt’, or ‘exciting hostility’.  
 
This paper considers, drawing on legislation and case law from other jurisdictions, and 
in light of the recent Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, the 
possibility of extending such legislation to protect gender and sexual minorities in New 
Zealand, and suggests a potential framework for such legislative change. The paper uses 
the inclusive terminology “gender and sexual minorities” (GSM), rather than the 
common ‘LGBT’ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender). The term is intended to act as 
a non-exclusive descriptor which also encompasses discrimination faced by gender 
minorities such as women who are not by default included in the LGBT spectrum.  
 
II  Balancing Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech 
 
Hate speech legislation involves a fundamental conflict with the right to freedom of 
expression. However, the interaction between these concepts can be reconciled to some 
extent. This section examines various jurisdictions’ approaches to such a balancing act, 
                                                
1 While this axiom is popularly attributed to Voltaire, it was in fact written by Evelyn Beatrice Hall The 
Friends of Voltaire (London, 1906) at 199; see Burdette Kinne “Voltaire Never Said It!” (1943) 58(7) 
Modern Language Notes at 534. 
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and considers how ‘hate speech’ can be interpreted and how censorship might be 
justified. 
 
A New Zealand legislation 
 
While New Zealand legislation currently does not address hate speech against gender or 
sexual minorities, it does include various provisions that act as hate speech legislation. 
Section 61 of the Human Rights Act 1993 covers ‘racial disharmony’ and makes it 
unlawful to “publish or distribute … written matter which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting”2, to “use in any public place … words which are threatening, abusive or 
insulting”3 or to use insulting, abusive or threatening words if they are “reasonably 
likely to be published”4 where those words are “likely to excite hostility against or bring 
into contempt any group of persons … on the ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or 
national origins of that group of persons”
5
. Complaints can be made to the Human 
Rights Commission,6 and these complaints may be considered by the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal7 and remedies granted including an order restraining the defendant 
from repeating the breach
8
 or damages.
9
 
 
Section 131 further prohibits ‘inciting racial disharmony’, which is defined as a similar 
set of behaviour as s 61 (publishing threatening, insulting, or abusive words) but also 
requires that the offender is acting with “intent to excite hostility or ill-will against, or 
bring into contempt or ridicule, any group of persons in New Zealand on the ground of 
the colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group”. This offence is punishable 
by a fine of up to $7000 or three months imprisonment, but can only be prosecuted with 
the consent of the Attorney-General, making it not often used in practice. 
 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 grants freedom of expression in s 14. However, it also 
grants freedom from discrimination in s 19. The existing racial disharmony provisions 
are centred within an anti-discrimination framework, indicating that they are intended to 
serve the purposes of freedom from discrimination under the Bill of Rights Act.  
 
B  Overseas Jurisdictions 
                                                
2 Human Rights Act 1993, s 61(1)(a). 
3 Section 61(1)(b). 
4 Section 61(1)(c). 
5 Section 61(1). 
6  Section 76(2)(a). 
7  Section 92B. 
8  Section 92I(3)(b). 
9  Section 92I(3)(c). 
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1 Australia 
 
Hate speech legislation in Australia is complex due first to the relationship between 
state and federal legislation, and secondly because Australia has no federal or 
constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights or Human Rights Act and thus no 
fundamental freedom of expression. Despite this lack, the Australian courts have 
implied a constitutional right to freedom of political communication.10 However as was 
made clear in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the rights implied “do not 
confer personal rights on individuals. Rather they preclude the curtailment of the 
protected freedom by the exercise of legislative or executive power.”11 Furthermore, the 
freedom is not absolute, but limited to “what is necessary for the effective operation [of 
representative responsible government].”
12
 As a result, Australian freedom of 
expression is significantly limited. 
 
Australia’s federal legislation does prohibit hate speech to some extent. The Racial 
Hatred Act 1995 added clauses into the original 1975 Racial Discrimination Act, 
making it unlawful to do a public act if “the act is reasonably likely, in all the 
circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of 
people.”13 However, the legislation only prohibits hate speech on the basis of “the race, 
colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person or of some or all of the people in 
the group.”
14
 Hate speech against other minorities, such as GSM groups, is therefore not 
prohibited under federal Australian law.  
 
Various Australian states have passed hate speech legislation which go further than 
federal law. The New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 makes racial 
vilification unlawful as in the federal Act
15
 but also prohibits homosexual vilification
16
 
under the Anti-Discrimination (Homosexual Vilification) Act 1993. This includes a 
criminal offence of “serious homosexual vilification” that requires the element of 
threatening physical harm or inciting others to threaten physical harm.
17
  
 
                                                
10 See Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v West Australian 
Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 
520. 
11 Lange v ABC, above n 10, at [44]. 
12 Lange v ABC, above n 10, at [48]-[49]. 
13 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Australia), s 18C(1)(a). 
14 Section (1)(b). 
15 New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (Australia), s 20C. 
16 Section 49ZT. 
17 Section 49ZTA. 
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The Transgender (Anti-Discrimination and other Acts Amendment) Act 1996 amended 
the Act so that it also prohibits transgender vilification18 and serious transgender 
vilification19 in the same way. A recent case considered what might be classed as 
transgender vilification; the respondent, in a conversation with a workmate, had said 
about a transgender colleague, “It's a fucking trannie taking hormones but still got tits 
and a box. I'll fucking punch its head through its own car window, cunt.”
20
  Although 
the complaint failed as the speech was found not to be ‘public’, the court found that the 
words:21 
 
[C]ould be seen as tending to encourage members of the public who heard the 
comments to treat transgender persons as less than fully human and to suggest that 
physical abuse of such persons was justifiable.  
 
The Court therefore considered that if the expression had been public, such expression 
was capable of being considered transgender vilification, or ‘hate speech’.22  
 
Both criminal ‘serious vilification’ offences bear a maximum penalty of six months 
imprisonment, but can only be prosecuted with the consent of the Attorney-General.23 
The lesser conduct of vilification can be pursued civilly in the Disputes Tribunal
24
 and 
include a defence on the grounds that the act was done “reasonably and in good faith, 
for academic, artistic, scientific, research or religious discussion or instruction purposes 
or for other purposes in the public interest, including discussion or debate about and 
expositions of any act or matter.”25 
 
The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 also protects against vilification. While 
the NSW Act separates each type of vilification, the Queensland Act makes vilification 
on the grounds of “race, religion, sexuality or gender identity” unlawful.
26
 It too 
includes a defence on the grounds of reasonable, good faith behaviour in the public 
interest, but excludes religion as a defence.
27
 The Queensland Act also includes an 
offence of “serious racial, religious, sexuality or gender identity vilification”, with the 
same requirements regarding threatening physical harm, and the same maximum 
                                                
18 Section 38S. 
19 Section 38T. 
20 Barry v Futter [2011] NSWADT 205 at [34]. 
21 At [85]. 
22 At [87]. 
23 New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, above n 15, ss 38T(2), 49ZTA(2). 
24 Section 108. 
25 Sections 38S(2)(c), 49ZT(2)(c). 
26 Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Australia), s 124A(1). 
27 Section 124(2)(c). 
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penalty, as the NSW legislation.
28
 In Owen v Menzies, the Supreme Court of 
Queensland found that a bisexual person may have standing to complain of vilification 
against homosexuals.29  
 
Similarly to NSW and Queensland, the Tasmania Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 
prohibits inciting hatred on the grounds of race, disability, sexual orientation or lawful 
sexual activity, or religious belief.30 Whereas both NSW and Queensland protect gender 
minorities (NSW referring to ‘transgender individuals’ and Queensland listing the 
ground of gender identity), the Tasmanian Act lacks protection on the basis of gender 
identity. This is a lack that could be addressed to further protect gender minorities. 
 
In both NSW and Queensland, the courts have been required to consider whether the 
anti-vilification legislation infringed or was inconsistent with the implied constitutional 
right to freedom of political communication. The courts applied the test first introduced 
by the High Court in Lange v ABC, which determines whether a statutory provision 
“impermissibly burdens the implied freedom of political communication”31 and which 
the court in Owen v Menzies laid out as follows:
32
 
 
[T]he first question is whether, in its terms, operation or effect, s 124A effectively 
burdens freedom of communication about government or political matters. If it 
does not, it is not unconstitutional. If it does burden the freedom, the second 
question is whether s 124A is reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a 
legitimate end in a manner compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of government. 
 
In Sunol v Collier (No 2) the NSW Court of Appeal was asked to consider “whether s 
49ZT of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) should be read down so as not to 
infringe or be construed so as to conform with the constitutional implication of freedom 
of communication about government and political matters.”
33
  
 
The court found that while s 49ZT did burden freedom of political communication, it 
was reasonable, legitimate and constitutionally compatible.
34
 The court made clear that 
freedom of communication was not absolute but “an implication of freedom under the 
                                                
28 Section 131A. 
29
 Owen v Menzies (2012) QCA 170 at [88]. 
30 Tasmania Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Australia), s 19. 
31 Owen v Menzies, above n 29, at [70]. 
32  At [70], referring to Lange v ABC, above n 10, at [49]. 
33 
Sunol v Collier (No 2) [2012]  NSWCA 44. 
34 Sunol v Collier (No 2), above n 33, at [46]. 
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law of an ordered and democratic society.”
35
 It also stressed that the question was not 
whether the legislative choice made by Parliament was the most preferable or desirable, 
but whether it was a reasonable means of achieving its purpose, in light of the burden 
placed on the constitutional freedom of communication.36  
 
Although the respondent argued that restricting his genuinely-held views was 
constitutionally invalid and constrained his ability to engage in political debate, the 
court made clear that even political debate may validly be restricted by anti-vilification 
laws:
37
  
 
It seems to me plain that seeking to prevent homosexual vilification is a legitimate 
end of government. A law seeking to prevent the incitement of such conduct seems 
to me compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally provided system of 
government. It does not seem to me that debate, however robust, needs to descend 
to public acts which incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule of a 
particular group of persons. Further, to the extent that what is recognised as 
legitimate political debate would fall within s 49ZT the exemption in s 49ZT(2)(c) 
in my opinion provides adequate protection. In those circumstances the legislation 
provides the appropriate balance between the legitimate end of preventing 
homosexual vilification and the requirement of freedom to discuss and debate 
government or political matters, required by the Constitution. 
 
In the Queensland case Owen v Menzies, the court also considered whether s 124A of 
the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act was inconsistent with the implied 
constitutional freedom of political communication.
38
 The respondent had published 
material such as “the only rights gays have is the right to die.”39 He argued “s 124A is 
either wholly invalid or should be read down to exclude conduct such as [his own] 
which is protected by the implied constitutional freedom of political 
communication.”40 After considering the scheme and purpose of the Act, the Court 
found that ss 124A(1) and (2), read together, did not burden the freedom of political 
communication – the first part of the Lange test.41 Rather, the court considered that:42 
 
                                                
35 At [47], referring to Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth supra at 169. 
36 At [48]. 
37 At [52]. 
38 Owen v Menzies, above n 29, at [61]. 
39 At [23]. 
40 At [69]. 
41 At [72]. 
42 At [72]-[73]. 
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[T]he terms of s 124A set parameters to enhance communications about 
government and political matters in a civilised, diverse democracy which values all 
its members, irrespective of race, religion, sexuality or gender identity. 
 
It is true, as Mr Owen submits, that insult and invective can be legitimate forms of 
political communication protected by the implied freedom. But simply because a 
statement contains insult and invective does not mean it relates to government or 
political matters. Insult and invective can be an effective form of legitimate 
political and government communication without, in the terms of s 124A, inciting 
hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of others on the ground of 
their race, religion, sexuality or gender identity. I cannot see that the incitement of 
hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of others on the grounds of 
race, religion, sexuality or gender can amount to political and government 
communication of the kind contemplated by the implied freedom under a diverse, 
modern democracy. 
 
The court recognised that this approach was in conflict with that taken by the NSW 
court in Sunol (No 2) but noted that its decision did reflect the minority view of Basten 
JA in that case.43 Although it answered in the negative to the first prong of the Lange 
test, it went on to shortly consider the second question, finding “no doubt” that the 
provision was reasonably appropriate and served a legitimate end, that end being:44 
 
[T]he promotion of equality of opportunity for all members of the community by 
prohibiting objectionable conduct inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and the 
Queensland Parliament's desire to improve the quality of democratic life through 
an educated community appreciative and respectful of the dignity and worth of all 
its members. 
 
It thus seems clear that in both NSW and Queensland, ‘hate speech’ anti-vilification 
legislation is considered to either not burden the implied constitutional freedom of 
political communication, or to create a burden which is nevertheless justified as 
reasonably appropriate and serving a legitimate end. This is especially true given the 
exceptions allowed for in both sets of legislation. 
 
 
2 Canada 
 
Like Australia, Canada has both federal and provincial legislation covering hate speech. 
Canada does however have federal human rights legislation – the Canadian Charter of 
                                                
43 At [76]. 
44 At [77]. 
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Rights and Freedoms,
45
 which forms part of the Canadian Constitution, and the 
Canadian Human Rights Act.46 The Charter grants freedom of expression47 as well as 
the right to equality and non-discrimination.48 The Human Rights Act is aimed at 
“extending the laws … that proscribe discrimination”49, and somewhat controversially 
included a section on “hate messages”.50 This section made it a “discriminatory 
practice” to communicate, by telephone or (later) by internet:
51
 
 
[A]ny matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by 
reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a 
prohibited ground of discrimination. 
 
This was challenged as unconstitutional in that it contravened the Charter right to 
freedom of expression, but the Supreme Court of Canada in a 4-3 decision held that it 
was constitutional and a reasonable limit on freedom of expression.
52
  
 
This was again challenged in a recent case decided first by the Canadian Human Rights 
Tribunal and then by the Canadian Federal Court. The Human Rights Tribunal, in 
Warman v Lemire, refused to apply s 13(1) on the grounds that the restrictions imposed 
were inconsistent with s 2(b) of the Charter.
53
 In 1998 and 2001 the Canadian 
Parliament had enacted amendments to the Human Rights Act, which gave the Tribunal 
additional remedial powers including granting compensation and ordering penalties54 
and included computer or internet communications in the scope of s 13(1).
55
 The 
Tribunal, taking these changes into account, considered that the modifications of the 
s 13 regime allowed it to revisit the question of justification,56 that the case was now 
distinguishable from Taylor, and that s 13 in conjunction with the penalty provisions 
was now inconsistent with the Charter. As a result the Tribunal declined to apply either 
s 13 or the penalty provisions. 
 
                                                
45 Constitution Act 1982 (Canada), Part I, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
46 Canadian Human Rights Act (Canada), RSC 1985, c H-6. 
47 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, above n 45, s 2(b). 
48 Section 15. 
49 Canadian Human Rights Act, above n 46. 
50 Section 13. 
51 Section 13(1), (2). 
52 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor [1990] 3 SCR 892. 
53 Canadian Human Rights Commission v Warman (2012) FC 1162. 
54 At [19]-[20]. See Canadian Human Rights Act ss 53(2)(e), 53(3), 54(1)(b), 54(1)(c). 
55 At [21]. See Canadian Human Rights Act s 13(2). 
56 At [28]. 
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The Federal Court overturned this decision, reverting to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Taylor and finding s 13(1) constitutional. However it too found that the penalty 
provisions were not justifiable under s 1 of the Charter and declared them of no force or 
effect.57 It noted that any consideration of the constitutionality of s 13 must be left to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
In a more recent development s 13 was repealed by a private member’s Bill that 
received assent on 26 June 2013, although the repeal will not take effect until 2014.58 At 
a federal level, hate speech is now governed only by s 319 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code. This section makes hate speech an indictable offence, but the requirements of the 
statute are far more limited and require incitement of hatred that is likely to lead to a 
breach of the peace.59 
 
Although hate speech is now less covered in Canadian federal law, various Canadian 
provinces continue to address hate speech in their provincial legislation. Since Warman 
was decided, the Supreme Court has returned its decision in Whatcott.60 Mr Whatcott 
had distributed flyers that were alleged to promote hatred against individuals on the 
basis of sexual orientation. Section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 
provides that:61 
 
No person shall publish or display… any representation … that exposes or tends to 
expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of any person 
or any class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground. 
 
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of s 14(1)(b), finding that it did 
breach freedom of expression but that it could be saved by s 1 of the Charter. This 
section operates as a limiting section equivalent to s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act. The test applied was that laid out in Oakes:62  
 
1) is the objective of the limit pressing and substantial;  
2) whether the provision is proportionate; 
a) is the limit rationally connected to its objective? 
b) Does the limit minimally impair the right or freedom? 
 
                                                
57 At [17]. 
58 Statutes of Canada 2013, Chapter 37, Bill C-304 (An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act 
(protecting freedom)). 
59 Canadian Criminal Code (Canada), s 319. 
60 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal (2013) SCC 11. 
61 Saskatchewan Human Rights Code (Canada), s 14(1)(b). 
62 R. v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
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The Court had “no difficulty” in finding the objective pressing and substantial.
63
 In 
considering proportionality, they first established that:64  
 
A prohibition of hate speech will only be rationally connected to the objective if its 
ambit is limited to expression publicly directed at a protected group, or at an 
individual on the basis that he or she is a member of that group. 
 
The Court discussed the inclusion of “ridicules, belittles, or affronts the dignity of” in s 
14(1)(b), as these words had been claimed to widen the ambit of the hate speech 
provision “to capture ‘hurt feelings’ and ‘affronts to dignity’ that are not tied to the 
objective of eliminating discrimination.”
65
 The Court found that the Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal had, both prior to and after the ruling in Taylor, applied the provision 
narrowly, “essentially … ignor[ing]” the more expansive wording.66 Nevertheless, it 
recognised that without an express declaration of invalidity, these words might have a 
chilling effect on expression.67 The Court found that the wording was not rationally 
connected to its objective and was therefore constitutionally invalid, so severed the 
words from the rest of the provision and formally struck them from the section.68 After 
considering whether the remainder of the provision minimally impaired freedom of 
expression –  taking into account the wording of the section, the nature of the expression 
affected, the place of political discourse, sexual orientation versus behaviour, intent, 
proof, and defences – the Court concluded that the section met the minimal impairment 
requirement, and thus:
69
 
 
The limitation imposed on freedom of expression by the prohibition in s. 14(1)(b) 
of the Code, when properly defined and understood, is demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society. 
 
As the Court explained, a hate speech case involves:70 
 
[B]alanc[ing] fundamental values underlying freedom of expression … in the 
context in which they are invoked, with competing Charter rights and other values 
essential to a free and democratic society, in this case, a commitment to equality 
and respect for group identity and the inherent dignity owed to all human beings. 
                                                
63 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, above n 60, at [77]. 
64 At [84]. 
65 At [85]. 
66 At [88]. 
67 Above. 
68 At [92]-[94]. 
69 At [151]. 
70 At [66]. 
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Whatcott illustrates that carefully worded provisions which take a restrictive 
interpretation toward the meaning of ‘hate speech’, while still infringing upon an 
absolute freedom of expression, can be justified constitutionally. 
 
3 South Africa 
 
South Africa’s Constitution entrenches freedom of expression under s 16, but makes 
explicitly clear in s 16(2)(c) that the right “does not extend to advocacy of hatred that is 
based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause 
harm.” The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000, known as the Equality Act, prohibits hate speech:71 
 
10(1)  Subject to the proviso in section 12 no person may publish, propagate, 
advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds 
against any person that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear 
intention to- 
(a) Be hurtful; 
(b) Be harmful or to incite harm; 
(c) Promote or propagate hatred. 
 
These prohibited grounds are both listed and unlisted, the latter being grounds which 
“perpetuate systemic disadvantage or loss of dignity or which affect a person in the 
same way as listed grounds.”72 In a 2010 case, the Equality Court found that public 
speech which perpetuates rape myths is hate speech against women.
73
 In that case, the 
respondent had made a public speech with regard to an earlier rape trial, S v Zuma, 
stating that:
74
 
 
When a woman didn’t enjoy it, she leaves early in the morning. Those who had a 
nice time will wait until the sun comes out, request breakfast and taxi money. In the 
morning that lady requested breakfast and taxi money. You don’t ask for taxi 
money from somebody who raped you. 
 
                                                
71 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000 (South Africa), s 10. 
72 Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema (2010) (7) BCLR 729 (EqC) at [11]. The complainant in the 
case, SONKE Gender Justice Network, is a non-profit organisation which works to “promote gender 
equality, prevent domestic and sexual violence, and reduce the spread and impact of HIV and AIDS.” 
<http://genderjustice.org.za>. 
73 Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema, above. 
74 At [2]. 
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The court heard evidence from an expert in the field of gender violence, who testified 
that the comment had distorted the actual findings of the case and created a myth 
regarding how women are expected to behave in the aftermath of a rape:75 
 
The comments made … rely upon generalisations about women, rape and consent 
which reinforce rape myths and that [the respondent] is abrogating to himself the 
prerogative of deciding what does and does not constitute rape. Myths and 
stereotypes are typically created by groups dominant in society. Thus, when men 
proclaim what is and is not sexual violence, and justify their reasoning with rape 
myths, they reinforce men’s dominance and perspectives at the expense of 
women’s equality.  
 
The Court found that “the uttered words could reasonably be construed as hurtful, 
harmful and demeaning to women” and therefore amounted to hate speech, and could 
not be excluded under s 12, which created a defence of ‘fair comment’. 
 
This case illustrates how what may not be conceived of as ‘hate speech’ can 
nevertheless fall within hate speech provisions. South African courts may be more likely 
to view public speech perpetuating rape myths as hate speech due to the extremely high 
rates of sexual assault in South Africa.76 The complainant made clear that the speech 
was considered “gender insensitive, more so in the light that South Africa has a high 
statistic of rape.”
77
 A legal form of challenging the way people, especially public 
figures, comment publicly about rape and sexual assault may be useful in addressing 
attitudes that contribute to such high statistics. 
 
4 United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom has extensive legislation covering what might be termed as ‘hate 
speech’, though none of it is framed within an anti-discrimination legislation framework 
as in other jurisdictions discussed, and none of it specifically relates to hate speech 
against gender and sexual minorities. The most far-reaching provisions are sections 4A 
and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which respectively prohibit using or displaying 
threatening, abusive or insulting words with intent to cause harassment, alarm, or 
distress (and thereby causing that harassment, alarm, or distress),78 and using or 
displaying threatening, abusive or insulting words “within the hearing or sight of a 
                                                
75 At [19]. 
76 Statistics South Africa Quantitative Research Findings on Rape in South Africa (2000) 
<http://www.statssa.gov.za>. 
77 Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema, above n 72, at [17](b)(iii). 
78  Public Order Act 1986 (United Kingdom), s 4A. 
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person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby”.
79
 The Public Order 
Act also includes more specific provisions regarding racial hatred.  
  
The United Kingdom has a Human Rights Act which grants its citizens certain rights 
and freedoms including freedom of expression:80  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
  
However, this right is expressly limited in a number of ways:81  
 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
These extensive limitations mean that the Public Order Act can likely be justified “for 
the prevention of disorder or crime”, but they would also protect hate speech legislation 
created within an anti-discrimination context. More specific hate speech legislation 
would offer better protection for gender and sexual minorities, and better clarification of 
the law for those required to apply it. There have been multiple incidents of evangelical 
Christians handing out homophobic leaflets being arrested under s 4A and 5 of the 
Public Order Act, but all cases have resulted in charges being dropped.
82
 In contrast, s 5 
often features in cases involving ‘football hooliganism’, indicating that the existing 
provisions are not enforced to punish hate speech or protect minorities but to deter 
public disorder and rioting.
83
  
 
Any new hate speech provision predicated on the same “harassment, alarm, or distress” 
requirement as s 5, however, would likely fail on questions of balancing against the 
                                                
79  Section 5. 
80 Human Rights Act 1998 (United Kingdom), Schedule I, Article 10(1). 
81 Article 10(2). 
82 See for example “Anti-gay leaflets charge dropped” (28 September 2006) BBC News UK 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/5388626.stm>. 
83 See for example R v O’Keefe [2003] All ER (D) 81 (Sep). 
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freedom of expression. Hate speech must go further than hurt feelings or offence. 
Equally, alarm and distress are not sufficient to justify banning types of expression.  
 
5 United States 
 
Unlike other jurisdictions mentioned here, the United States First Amendment grants a 
near-absolute freedom of speech which is not balanced against other rights and 
freedoms as part of an overall constitutional/rights framework. While some limitations 
have been successful, hate speech legislation has not been considered constitutionally 
valid. In the Skokie case, American Nazis planned a rally march through Skokie, largely 
settled by Jewish Holocaust survivors.84 The town sought an injunction against the 
Nazis, but this was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on the basis that the 
injunction preventing wearing swastikas and distributing “materials which incite or 
promote hatred against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry” was an infringement of the 
group’s First Amendment rights.   
 
Similarly, an ordinance which made it a disorderly conduct misdemeanour to display a 
symbol or graffiti “which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” was 
struck down by the United States Supreme Court as “facially unconstitutional in that it 
prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech 
addresses.”
85
 The Court considered content-based regulation and found that while it is 
not absolute,86 “the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual 
viewpoint discrimination”87 and that it “comes within neither any of the specific 
exceptions to the First Amendment prohibition … nor a more general exception for 
content discrimination that does not threaten censorship of ideas.”88 Despite the 
ordinance being intended to protect vulnerable minority groups,89 it could not be 
justified within the context of First Amendment requirements.  
 
C Justifying Hate Speech Censorship 
 
While examining various hate speech provisions makes clear that many jurisdictions do 
censor hate speech, it does not necessarily explain why hate speech ought to be 
                                                
84 National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie 432 US 43 (1977). 
85 RAV v City of St Paul 505 US 377 (1992) at 381. 
86 At 387. 
87 At 391. 
88 At 393. 
89 At 394. 
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censored. A range of justifications for censorship can be found both in academic writing 
and in judicial cases. 
 
1 Discrimination 
 
In evaluating hate speech legislation, many courts characterise the balancing act as one 
between the freedom of expression claimed by one citizen, and the freedom from 
discrimination claimed by another. This is because, as the Supreme Court recognised in 
Whatcott:
90
  
 
Hate speech is, at its core, an effort to marginalize individuals based on their 
membership in a group.  Using expression that exposes the group to hatred, hate 
speech seeks to delegitimize group members in the eyes of the majority, reducing 
their social standing and acceptance within society. 
 
… Hate speech, therefore, rises beyond causing emotional distress to individual 
group members.  It can have a societal impact. If a group of people are considered 
inferior, sub-human, or lawless, it is easier to justify denying the group and its 
members equal rights or status.  
 
The Court extrapolated this “societal impact” of hate speech to identify that “[i]f a 
group of people are considered inferior, sub-human, or lawless, it is easier to justify 
denying the group and its members equal rights or status.”91 
 
Both Jeremy Waldron and Ishani Maitra discuss how a lack of governmental response to 
hate speech can be seen as eroding social assurance or granting authority to hate 
speakers. Waldron argues that the point of hate speech is not just for hate speakers to let 
off steam, but to “target [and] negate the implicit assurance that a society offers to the 
members of vulnerable groups.”
92
 If the state does not challenge such hate speech, it not 
only risks harm to minorities, it risks the establishment of “a rival public good” that 
undermines the “public good of implicit assurance” and indicates to others that they are 
not alone in their bigotry.93 
 
Maitra observes that where “those who do have basic authority, and thus are in a 
position to criticise or otherwise disavow [the hate speaker's] actions, clearly and 
                                                
90 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [71], [74]. 
91 At [74]. 
92 Jeremy Waldron The Harm in Hate Speech (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
2012) at 88. 
93 At 94-95. 
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markedly fail to do so … this omission confers derived authority.”
94
 This derived 
authority then grants the hate speakers the ability to perform what he describes as 
“authoritative illocutions”, a type of speech that constitutes subordination and constructs 
a social reality for the subordinated minority.95 Maitra therefore contends that permitting 
hate speech creates tacit approval for those seeking to marginalise minorities and to 
discriminate against them in more overt ways. 
 
2 Denying speech 
 
Another argument against hate speech is that by subordinating and attacking minorities, 
it also attacks their ability to engage in speech of their own. The Court in Whatcott 
identified a particular way in which hate speech denies minorities full and equal 
participation in any public debate:96  
 
Hate speech is not only used to justify restrictions or attacks on the rights of 
protected groups on prohibited grounds. … [H]ate propaganda opposes the targeted 
group’s ability to find self-fulfillment by articulating their thoughts and ideas. It 
impacts on that group’s ability to respond to the substantive ideas under debate, 
thereby placing a serious barrier to their full participation in our democracy. 
Indeed, a particularly insidious aspect of hate speech is that it acts to cut off any 
path of reply by the group under attack.  It does this not only by attempting to 
marginalize the group so that their reply will be ignored: it also forces the group to 
argue for their basic humanity or social standing, as a precondition to participating 
in the deliberative aspects of our democracy. 
 
… In this way, the expression inhibits the protected group from interacting and 
participating in free expression and public debate. 
 
Caroline West makes a similar argument cast in a different light. She refers to two 
related concepts, comprehension failure and consideration failure, and the way in which 
both concepts are affected and reinforced by hate speech.97 The former involves a belief 
in audiences that a particular class of people are “by nature intellectually simple, 
incapable of complex or fully rational thought”, a belief which if reinforced by hate 
speech will have the effect of “preventing [minorities] from communicating all but the 
most simple opinions.”
98
 The latter, consideration failure, may be more prevalent in the 
                                                
94 Ishani Maitra “Subordinating Speech” in Ishani Maitra and Mary Kate McGowan Speech and Harm: 
Controversies over Free Speech (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 94 at 110. 
95 At 99. 
96 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [75]-[76]. 
97 Caroline West “Words that Silence” in Speech and Harm, above n 94, 222 at 239-243. 
98 At 243. 
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case of hate speech against gender and sexual minorities: it exists where: “the audience 
grasps what the speaker means to say perfectly well, but ignores it or dismisses it … 
because they believe the speaker is not the kind of person worth listening to.”99 West 
argues that “there is considerable evidence that … hate speech … functions to 
undermine the attention and consideration that is paid to the speech of those it 
targets.”
100
 She further states that:
101
 
 
[C]onsideration failure can here form part of a self-reinforcing cycle of 
marginalization. … This cycle must somehow be interrupted if members of 
historically marginalized groups are to have a reasonable chance of reshaping the 
moral and political environment through speech. 
 
Thus hate speech can in multiple ways be seen as attacking minorities’ ability to 
communicate and engage in equal participation within society and societal discussion. 
 
3 Harm 
 
Proponents of anti-hate speech legislation often argue that hate speech goes further than 
offensiveness; it is a type of harm. Waldron makes clear that this harm should be 
considered in the context of its victims, the vulnerable members of society; “[i]t is not 
harm – if I can put it bluntly – to the white liberals who find the racist invective 
distasteful.”102 As Asaf Fisher recognises, “[i]t causes injury. It is the verbal equivalent 
of a ‘slap in the face.’”
103
 Anne Scahill, in a consideration of the NSW homosexual 
vilification legislation, refers to Joel Bakan’s analysis of harm in relation to 
pornography, which she sees as “an interesting framework which may be utilised in 
examining the concept of harm in the vilification debate.”
104
 Bakan outlines two bases 
of justification for the suppression of pornography:105 
 
1. The direct harm basis; pornography causes direct psychological harm to 
women as it diminishes women’s dignity and thereby causes hurt. There are 
many examples of the recognition of psychological harm in the law, including 
assault which may be occasioned by words, for example by defamation or 
sexual harassment. 
                                                
99 Above. 
100 Above. 
101 At 245. 
102 Waldron, above n 92, at 33. 
103 Asaf Fisher “Regulating Hate Speech” (2006) 8 UTS L Rev 21 at 29. 
104 Anne Scahill “Can Hate Speech Be Free Speech?” (1994) 4 Australasian Gay & Lesbian LJ 1 at 20. 
105 At 20, quoting Joel Bakan “Pornography, Law and Moral Theory” (1985) 17 Ottawa L R 1. 
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2. The provocation basis; pornography provokes men to behave in a way that 
causes direct harm to women either through violence or discrimination. 
 
These two bases can be used similarly to examine harm in hate speech. Scahill identifies 
that:
106
 
 
As many societal attitudes may direct that the loss of homosexual dignity is 
regarded as a poor justification for interference with freedom of expression; 
advocates of homosexual vilification legislation are more likely to rely on the 
provocation thesis; arguing that negative public statements about homosexual men 
incite hatred, discrimination and violence against them. 
 
In another evaluation of the NSW measures, Ryan Takach details the actual violence 
directed against sexual minorities, finding that “[t]he Bill was unarguably prompted by 
the high level of violence directed against gay men and lesbian women because of their 
homosexuality.”107 He refers to multiple research initiatives that have “documented the 
nature and extent of such violence”
108
, including ‘gay hate’ murders, physical injury and 
verbal assault. Takach found that “[i]n light of the survey findings, language is seen to 
play a major role in violence against lesbians and gay men.”
109
 On the basis of such 
findings, supporters of hate speech legislation argue that:110 
 
[V]iolence and crimes against lesbian and gay citizens have real and tangible links 
to daily behaviour as a result of the messages which are imprinted in the cultural 
psyche by such language. 
 
Despite these links between hate speech and violence, some opponents argue against 
justifying hate speech legislation based on only a ‘risk’ of harm. The Court in Whatcott 
found that:111 
 
Such an approach, however, ignores the particularly insidious nature of hate 
speech.  The end goal of hate speech is to shift the environment from one where 
harm against vulnerable groups is not tolerated to one where hate speech has 
created a place where this is either accepted or a blind eye is turned. 
 
The Court similarly recognised that:112 
                                                
106 At 21. 
107 Ryan Takach “Gay and Lesbian Inequality: The Anti-Vilification Measures” (1994) 4 Australasian Gay 
& Lesbian LJ 30 at 30. 
108 At 321. 
109 At 33. 
110 At 34. 
111 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [131]. 
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As the majority becomes desensitized by the effects of hate speech, the concern is 
that some members of society will demonstrate their rejection of the vulnerable 
group through conduct.  Hate speech lays the groundwork for later, broad attacks 
on vulnerable groups. These attacks can range from discrimination, to ostracism, 
segregation, deportation, violence and, in the most extreme cases, to genocide 
(see Taylor and Keegstra). 
 
It seems relatively clear that hate speech legislation can be justified at the very least 
through demonstration of Bakan’s ‘provocation’ concept. While Scahill might be correct 
in finding that societal attitudes tend to disregard the diminishment of dignity as a valid 
harm that justifies censorship, various legal theorists have developed the concept into 
one which may be considered separately to ‘harm’. 
 
4 Denying dignity and assurance 
 
Waldron uses ‘dignity’ as a catch-all term to describe a person’s basic social standing 
and assurance, the right to be treated “as proper objects of society’s protection and 
concern”, and the “fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle them to be treated as 
equals in the ordinary operations of society.”113 He argues that:114 
 
[T]he publication of hate speech is calculated to undermine this [and] compromise 
the dignity of those at whom it is targeted, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of 
other members of society. 
 
The point of hate speech legislation, in this conception, is that dignity “as a society and 
legal status … has to be established, upheld, maintained, and vindicated by society and 
the law.”115 
 
D Defining Hate Speech 
 
Considering the various definitions of ‘hate speech’ across jurisdictions, it seems clear 
that a unified conception of hate speech could assist with avoiding overreaching into the 
realm of free expression. The more carefully and narrowly ‘hate speech’ is defined, the 
less likely it is to impair this freedom, while still achieving its purpose in protecting 
vulnerable groups and individuals within society. That Canada recently repealed its 
federal hate speech provision indicates that even jurisdictions which are generally 
                                                                                                                                       
112 At [74]. 
113 Waldron, above n 92, at 5. 
114 Above. 
115 At 60. 
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comfortable with censoring some expression are cautious about overly-broad hate 
speech legislation. Any legislation which strikes at free expression ought to be relatively 
focussed in scope, so as to not catch too much speech in its net. 
 
Definitions of hate speech tend to fall at various points on a spectrum where one end 
involves only the most egregious examples – speech which actively and intentionally 
incites hatred, violence and abuse. The other end of the spectrum includes speech that is 
hurtful, offensive or distressing, but which does not necessarily convey hatred or serious 
contempt. 
 
Vilification, as defined in Australia, does appear to involve abuse and hatred. Certainly, 
the NSW legislature and courts have turned away from a lower level definition. The 
legislation requires that hate speech must ‘incite hatred towards, serious contempt for, 
or severe ridicule of, a person or group of persons.’ The Court in Sunol v Collier ruled 
that:116 
 
[S]atisfaction of s 49ZT(1) is not necessarily to be assumed or concluded by rude, 
indecorous, base or insulting language that reflects some dislike of, or opposition 
to, homosexuality. The section provides for an act to incite hatred, serious 
contempt, or severe ridicule. Fine linguistic distinctions should of course not be 
drawn which may deflect attention from the language of the statute. The words of 
the statute are to be applied with a recognition of the degree or quality of the act 
contemplated by the language. The act is to be assessed by reference to the context 
in which it takes place, including the audience or likely audience. 
 
As recognised by anti-discrimination authors in Australia, legislation following the 
“NSW model” has given rise to “a number of issues concerning the interpretation of this 
element of the civil wrong.”
117
 These issues were considered in Veloskey v 
Karagiannakis, and the outcome was summarised by the Court in Barry v Futter:
118 
 
(a) The word ‘incite’ in this context has its ordinary English meaning, 
namely, to urge, spur on, stir up, animate, stimulate or prompt to action; 
(b) It is not sufficient if words merely convey hatred or express serious 
contempt or severe ridicule; 
                                                
116 Sunol v Collier (No 2), above n 33, at [62]. 
117 Neil Rees, Katherine Lindsay and Simon Rice Australian Anti-Discrimination Law: Texts, Cases and 
Materials (Federation Press, Annandale, New South Wales, 2008) at 582. 
118 Barry v Futter, above n 20, at [81], referring to Veloskey v Karagiannakis [2002] NSWADTAP 18 at 
[21], [24], [25], [26], [28]. 
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(c) Section 38S does not require any intention to incite on the part of the 
respondent to the complaint, nor is it necessary that the complainant prove 
that anyone was actually incited by the public act to respond in the 
requisite manner;  
(d) What is required is that the public act is capable, in an objective sense, 
of inciting others to feel hatred towards or serious contempt for, or severe 
ridicule of a person or persons on the [protected ground];  
(e) The question therefore to be addressed is could the ordinary, reasonable 
hearer understand from the public act that he or she is being incited to 
hatred towards or serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of a person or 
persons on the [protected ground]? The question is not, could the ordinary 
reasonable reader reach such a conclusion after his/her own beliefs have 
been brought into play by the public act? 
 
As a result, it is clear that legislation based on the NSW model is near the top end of the 
spectrum, although it does not require actual intention on the part of the speaker or 
actual incitement on the part of the audience. 
 
In the Canadian context, the court in Taylor found that:119 
 
The terms of the section, in particular the phrase ‘hatred or contempt’, are 
sufficiently precise and narrow to limit its impact to those expressive activities 
which are repugnant to Parliament's objective of promoting equality and tolerance 
in society. That no special provision exists to emphasize the importance of 
minimally impairing the freedom of expression does not create in s 13(1) an overly 
wide or loose scope, for both its purpose and the common law's traditional desire to 
protect expressive activity permit an interpretation solicitous of this important 
freedom. 
 
The Court of Appeal in Warman referred to “more precise guidelines as to what 
constitutes hate speech” which had been laid down by the Canadian Tribunal in Warman 
v Kouba.120 It established these as follows:121  
 
(a) The targeted group is portrayed as a powerful menace that is taking control of 
the major institutions in society and depriving others of their livelihoods, safety, 
freedom of speech and general well-being;  
                                                
119 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor, above n 52, at [81]. 
120 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Warman, above n 53, at [124], referring to Warman v Kouba 
(2006) CHRT 50 at 24-81. 
121 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Warman at [124]. 
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(b) The messages use "true stories", news reports, pictures and references from 
purportedly reputable sources to make negative generalizations about the targeted 
group;  
(c) The targeted group is portrayed as preying upon children, the aged, the 
vulnerable, etc.;  
(d) The targeted group is blamed for the current problems in society and the world;  
(e) The targeted group is portrayed as dangerous or violent by nature;  
(f) The messages convey the idea that members of the targeted group are devoid of 
any redeeming qualities and are innately evil;  
(g) The messages communicate the idea that nothing but the banishment, 
segregation or eradication of this group of people will save others from the harm 
being done by this group;  
(h) The targeted group is de-humanized through comparisons to and associations 
with animals, vermin, excrement, and other noxious substances;  
(i) Highly inflammatory and derogatory language is used in the messages to create 
a tone of extreme hatred and contempt;  
(j) The messages trivialize or celebrate past persecution or tragedy involving 
members of the targeted group; and  
(k) The messages contain calls to take violent action against the targeted group.  
 
As the Court recognised, “[t]hese ‘hallmarks’ of hate speech can not be characterized as 
vague and imprecise.”122 Rather, they create specific benchmarks against which any 
potential hate speech can be applied. They also illustrate that one can engage in 
contentious debate, and even criticise minority groups, without attacking them in a way 
that exposes them to hatred and harm. 
 
Canada differs from the NSW Australian model in that it does not include ‘ridicule’. 
However, NSW courts made clear that only ‘severe ridicule’ was to be included. As 
identified in Whatcott, severe ridicule may go beyond humour and expose the target to 
hatred.123 While the Court in Whatcott chose to remove ridicule from the wording of the 
Saskatchewan hate speech provision, on the basis that “the risk results from the intensity 
of the ridicule reaching a level where the target becomes exposed to hatred” rather than 
the ridicule itself, it does not seem that including severe ridicule will in practice censor 
much more expression than is already caught.
124
 
 
It is clear that the South African concept of hate speech is far broader and toward the 
lower end of the spectrum. The court in Sonke Justice v Malema recognised that:125 
                                                
122 At [125]. 
123 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [91]. 
124 At [91]. 
125 Sonke Gender Justice Network v Malema, above n 72, at [13]. 
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[I]t is clear that the Equality Act's definition of hate speech is broad. It extends 
beyond communicated words that promote hatred by specifically including within 
its scope the communication of words that are hurtful or harmful. 
 
Hurt or harm in this context is not limited to direct physical harm, and extends to 
an attack on dignity. 
 
Comparing this definition with that discussed in Whatcott, the Canadian courts have 
taken a far more restrictive stance. Canadian courts “have generally identified only 
extreme and egregious examples of delegitimizing expression as hate speech.  This 
approach excludes merely offensive or hurtful expression from the ambit of the 
provision.”
126
 In the context of a Bill of Rights or Charter such as New Zealand’s or 
Canada’s, neither of which includes an express limitation on freedom of expression as 
the South African Constitution does, the broad concept of hate speech does not seem 
appropriate. That said, it may be that the South African Equality Act’s use of ‘hurtful or 
harmful’ does not refer so much to ‘hurt feelings’ as to the kind of societal harm and 
denial of dignity discussed as potential justifications above. This interpretation would 
bring the South African concept of hate speech more in line with the others discussed. 
 
III  Legislating Against Hate Speech in New Zealand 
 
A Existing Censorship in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand is, to some extent, fundamentally comfortable with the concept of 
censoring certain types of expression. Censorship in New Zealand tends to be 
predicated on a basis of harm or injury to the public good. 
 
1 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 and the Office of Film 
and Literature  
 
The Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA) both requires 
and allows for the classification of various material as “objectionable”, defined as 
material which “describes, depicts, expresses or otherwise deals with matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence in such a manner that the availability of the 
publication is likely to be injurious to the public good.”
127
 
 
                                                
126 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [46]. 
127 Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, s 3(1). 
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This classification is carried out by the Office of Film and Literature (OFLC) and is 
based on various criteria, including:
128
 
 
[T]he extent and degree to which, and the manner in which, the publication 
represents (whether directly or by implication) that members of any particular class 
of the public are inherently inferior to other members of the public by reason of 
any characteristic of members of that class, being a characteristic that is a 
prohibited ground of discrimination specified in section 21(1) of the Human Rights 
Act 1993. 
 
On the face of this section, it appears that the OFLC has the power to censor material 
that could be considered hate speech. However, case law has narrowed the application 
of s 3, and as a result, the OFLC is limited in what it can legally censor. 
 
2 Limitations on OFLC power 
 
The OFLC is limited by a “subject matter gateway”. This is the requirement of s 3(1) 
that the material “deal with matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence”. In 
Living Word, involving videos which opposed granting rights to gay people and which 
had been classified as ‘objectionable’ under s 3(3)(e), the Court of Appeal considered 
this subject matter gateway and found that:129  
 
The words used in s 3 limit the qualifying publications to those that can fairly be 
described as dealing with the matters of the kinds listed. … The collocation of 
words “sex, horror, crime, cruelty or violence”, as the matters dealt with, tends to 
point to activity rather than to the expression of opinion or attitude. 
 
Furthermore, the Court ruled that “[i]t is therefore wrong to approach the Act as if it is 
directed at preventing discrimination.”130 This ruling ensured that the OFLC is limited 
in its censorship abilities. As the Government Administration Committee found in its 
Inquiry into Censorship Issues in March 2003:
131
 
 
The Court of Appeal …  also held that the application of section 3(1) of the Act 
was restricted to those publications that described, depicted or otherwise dealt with 
activity of a sexual, violent, or criminal nature, rather than applying to those 
publications that were attempting to convey an attitude or opinion. 
                                                
128 S 3(3)(e). 
129 Living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group Wellington [2000] 3 NZLR 570 (CA) 
Richardson P at [28]. 
130 Thomas J at [76]. 
131 Government Administration Committee Inquiry into Censorship Issues (March 2003) I.5A at 15-16. 
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… The effect of the Living Word decision has been to limit the scope of ‘matters 
such as sex’ so as not to cover sexual orientation, the sexual transmission of HIV, 
or the ‘hate speech’ related to them. 
 
The Inquiry into Censorship Issues proposed two options for extending OFLC power 
relating to censorship of objectionable material; either removing the subject matter 
gateway, or replacing ‘such as’ with ‘includes’. The Inquiry recognised that either 
option:132 
 
[W]ould negate the need for the inclusion of a specific ‘hate speech’ section in the 
Act. If the Act is amended as we recommend, the censors would be able to address 
issues of this nature by application of the ‘injury to the public good’ test. The 
censorship net would be able to reach, for example, the material that vilified certain 
groups in the Living Word videos without the need to explicitly identify such 
groups in the Act. Government members find this acceptable, particularly as it will 
not elevate the importance of any one group over another. 
 
Despite this recommendation, s 3(1) has not been amended to incorporate either of these 
options. Following the Inquiry into Censorship Issues, the Government Administration 
Committee initiated an Inquiry into Hate Speech in 2004. However, although 
submissions were made to the Inquiry, it was discharged in 2006 with no report or 
outcomes eventuating. 
 
B Extending Hate Speech Legislation 
 
1 Proposed legislation 
 
After examining other types of hate speech legislation that protect gender and sexual 
minorities, and different conceptions of how ‘hate speech’ should be interpreted, I 
submit that it is appropriate for New Zealand to enact a provision extending protection 
from hate speech including the basis of gender and sexual orientation. 
 
a) Human Rights Act provisions 
 
I recommend that s 61 of the Human Rights Act be repealed and replaced with a new 
section entitled ‘Hate speech’. The new section will remove the wording “words or 
matter which is threatening, abusive, or insulting” as well as the passage: 
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Being matter or words likely to excite hostility against or bring into contempt any 
group of persons in or who may be coming to New Zealand on the ground of the 
colour, race, or ethnic or national origins of that group of persons. 
 
This will be replaced with the passage: 
 
Words or matter which exposes or tends to expose to hatred or contempt any 
person or class of persons on the basis of their race or ethnic or national origin, 
religion, sexuality or gender identity. 
 
Section 131 will be similarly amended, with the title renamed ‘Inciting hatred’, the 
words “hostility or ill-will against, or bring into contempt or ridicule” replaced with 
“hatred or contempt against”, and the words “ground of the colour, race, or ethnic or 
national origins of that group of persons” amended to read “on the ground of the race or 
ethnic or national origin, religion, sexuality or gender identity of that group of persons”.  
 
Although this paper focuses on GSM hate speech protections, I have included race and 
religion as other protected groups but have not extended protection to all prohibited 
grounds of discrimination as established in s 21 of the Human Rights Act. This is in 
contrast to the choice of overseas jurisdictions such as Saskatchewan and South Africa, 
but other jurisdictions such as Queensland have chosen to specify grounds. The four 
grounds I have specified are the most likely to face hate speech given the legal and 
historical context, and the legislation as recommended would adequately protect the 
most vulnerable groups within society. 
 
b) FVPCA provisions 
 
The Office of Film and Literature Classification made a submission to the Inquiry into 
Hate Speech in October 2004 arguing that:133 
 
If the legislature has decided that the social harm caused by hate speech is 
sufficient to warrant civil or criminal remedies, then the extent to which a film 
requiring classification is itself hate speech should logically become a matter 
relevant to its classification. Not to make it so would tend to undermine the 
purpose of legislation providing civil and criminal remedies for injury caused by 
hate speech, and with respect to publications requiring classification, would result 
in a perception of government approval of films and other publications containing 
hate speech. 
 
                                                
133 Office of Film and Literature Classification Submission: Inquiry into Hate Speech (29 October 2004) 
at 26. 
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I concur with this opinion. The OFLC is the relevant responsible body. It is entrusted 
with censoring other material on the basis of public harm. If hate speech legislation is 
justifiable on the basis of harm to minority groups, then it stands to reason that the 
OFLC should have its powers extended so that it can make decisions on the basis of 
hatred. 
 
Section 3(1) could be amended to follow the recommendation of the Government 
Administration Committee to remove the subject matter gateway of “such as sex, 
horror, crime, cruelty, or violence”. However, the subject matter gateway restricts the 
OFLC’s power of censorship and to remove it would significantly expand this power 
beyond what was originally conceived in the legislation. The passage “matters such as 
sex, horror, crime, cruelty, or violence” in s 3 of the FVPCA should therefore be 
amended to read “matters such as sex, horror, crime, cruelty, hate speech, or violence”. 
As the Committee recognises, “such amendment will provide a focus on the ‘injurious 
to the public good’ test” and would capture matters including expression classed as hate 
speech.134 
 
2 Balancing against the Bill of Rights 
 
Any new legislation governing hate speech would necessarily conflict with freedom of 
expression under the Bill of Rights Act. However, as recognised above, New Zealand 
does not grant freedom of expression in the same near-absolute manner as the United 
States First Amendment. Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act provides:135 
 
Subject to section 4, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
 
New Zealand courts would thus be required to carry out the same determination as the 
Canadian Supreme Court did in Whatcott, to establish whether the limits imposed by the 
hate speech provision are a reasonable limit upon freedom of expression. It is partly for 
this reason that I have followed the Canadian model of hate speech; applying a more 
restrictive wording designed to catch only the most extreme types of expression will 
necessarily ensure that freedom of expression is subjected to a lesser limit.  
 
Furthermore, s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act requires that:136 
 
                                                
134 Government Administration Committee Inquiry into Censorship Issues, above n 131, at 24. 
135 Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
136 Section 6. 
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Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights 
and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to 
any other meaning. 
 
This section means that New Zealand courts would strive to interpret any hate speech 
provision as consistently as possible with freedom of expression. In practice, this would 
likely mean that a restrictive interpretation to the provision would be applied. 
 
New Zealand courts do not have the power to strike down legislation on the basis that it 
is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and is not a justified limit. If New Zealand were to 
pass new legislation including prohibitions against ridicule or insulting language, the 
courts would not be able to remove those words from the provision as the Canadian 
Supreme Court did in Whatcott. This is another reason for any new hate speech 
legislation to be constructed as narrowly as possible while still protecting minority 
groups from vilification and exposure to hatred.  
 
As the Government Administration Committee made clear in the Inquiry into 
Censorship Issues, “[c]ensorship and classification should therefore always entail a 
careful balancing of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘harm’.”
137
 Applying a high threshold 
for ‘hate speech’ will assist with such a balancing. 
 
3 What might be covered? 
 
a) Political speech 
 
Some 'speech' that can be seen as hate speech could be seen as deserving greater 
protection due to its status as ‘political speech’. Mary Kate McGowan argues against 
this conception:138   
 
The mere fact that an utterance expresses a political opinion cannot reasonably be 
treated as a sufficient condition of that utterance being political speech in the First 
Amendment sense … thus, the mere fact that racist hate speech expresses a 
political opinion is not sufficient reason to view it as highly protected political 
expression.  
 
The Supreme Court in Whatcott acknowledged that “[w]hile hate speech constitutes a 
type of expression that lies at the periphery of the values underlying freedom of 
                                                
137 Government Administration Committee Inquiry into Censorship Issues, above n 131, at 19. 
138 Mary Kate McGowan “On ‘Whites Only’ Signs and Racist Hate Speech: Verbal Acts of Racial 
Discrimination” in Speech and Harm, above n 94, at 122. 
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expression, political expression lies close to the core of the guarantee.”
139
 They were 
required to consider the relationship between hate speech and political speech as the 
respondent argued that his flyers were “commentary on a social policy debate” at the 
core of protected expression.140 The Court was not particularly open to this argument, 
however:141 
 
The expression captured under hate speech laws is of an extreme nature.  Framing 
that speech as arising in a “moral” context or “within a public policy debate” does 
not cleanse it of its harmful effect.  Indeed, if one understands an effect of hate 
speech as curtailing the ability of the affected group to participate in the debate, 
relaxing the standard in the context of political debate is arguably more rather than 
less damaging to freedom of expression.  As argued by some interveners, history 
demonstrates that some of the most damaging hate rhetoric can be characterized as 
“moral”, “political” or “public policy” discourse. 
 
It too considered that merely because expression may be classed as political speech does 
not negate the possibility of it also constituting hate speech.142 They distinguished 
between hate speech “of a restrictive and exclusionary kind” and political expression, 
which “contributes to our democracy by encouraging the exchange of opposing 
views.”
143
 The Court also referred again to the speech-denying characteristic of hate 
speech, finding that “speech that has the effect of shutting down public debate cannot 
dodge prohibition on the basis that it promotes debate.”144 
 
The Court made clear that hate speech legislation is not aimed at shutting down 
criticism of minority groups, even “repugnant or offensive ideas [or] expression which 
debates the merits of reducing the rights of vulnerable groups in society.”145 They 
spelled out that “[t]he polemicist may still participate on controversial topics that may 
be characterized as ‘moral’ or ‘political’.  However, words matter.”
146
 A person critical 
of homosexual behaviour should be able to express that criticism, and engage in public 
debate where it arises. Equally, however, the court recognised “that the rights of a 
vulnerable group are a matter of ongoing discussion does not justify greater exposure by 
that group to hatred and its effects.”147 The Court clearly draws a distinction between 
                                                
139 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [115]. 
140 At [115]. 
141 At [116]. 
142 At [117]. 
143 At [117]. 
144 At [117]. 
145 At [51]. 
146 At [119]. 
147 At [171]. 
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valid political expression, which may be critical or disagree with granting rights to 
minorities, and expression which uses political expression and public debate as a veiled 
excuse to vilify the minority group.  
 
Applying such an interpretation to the submissions and publications regarding the 
New Zealand Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, the vast 
majority would not be caught by hate speech legislation. Even those which argue 
against the extension of marriage rights would be able to express such sentiment 
freely. Although the submissions made by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints and Family First, for example,148 both disagree with the extension of marriage 
rights to GSM individuals, they do not seek to vilify that group to the extent required; 
their views do not personally attack gay or lesbian people as degenerate or subhuman. 
In comparison, the leaflets at Appendix 2 go far further in characterising a gay 
lifestyle as “risky and contagious”, “bringing disease … [and] early deaths and 
suicides” and corrupting children.149 These characteristics can be seen as falling 
within the ‘hallmarks’ of hatred set out in Warman.150 Thus the only submissions that 
would face hate speech penalties would be those which exposed the LGBT minority 
to hatred and contempt – those which dehumanised and vilified the group in “an 
extreme and marginal type of expression which contributes little to the values 
underlying freedom of expression.”151 As a result, the vast majority of political speech 
would continue to receive the protection of free expression. 
 
b) Humour 
 
Expression created in the guise of humour can, intentionally or unintentionally, attack a 
minority group. A recent New Zealand example was a Tui beer billboard advertisement 
which read “Dad’s new husband seems nice – Yeah Right.” The billboard was the 
subject of multiple complaints to the Advertising Standards Authority, on the basis that 
“the advertisement was homophobic; and called into question the validity of same-sex 
relationships.” In handling the complaint, the ASA Chairman recognised that Tui ads 
were “well-known for making provocative statements across a wide spectrum of society 
                                                
148 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Outline of Position; Family First Submission (submissions 
to Government Administration Committee on Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill 
2013), attached at Appendix 2. 
149 Anti-marriage equality leaflets mailed to MPs during the submission process of the Marriage 
(Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013, as collected by David Farrar “Some anti same sex 
marriage correspondence” (12 April 2013) Kiwiblog 
<http://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/2013/04/some_anti_same_sex_marriage_correspondence.html)>, attached 
at Appendix 1. 
150 Warman v Kouba, above n 120, at [124]. 
151 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [120]. 
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and about topical issues.”
152
 Nevertheless, the ASA found no grounds to proceed with 
the complaint. Could such satirical humour be punished under hate speech legislation? 
 
The Supreme Court in Whatcott considered, during their discussion of the words 
“ridicules or belittles”, the place of humour in hate speech. They found that:153 
 
Expression criticizing or creating humour at the expense of others can be 
derogatory to the extent of being repugnant. Representations belittling a minority 
group or attacking its dignity through jokes, ridicule or insults may be hurtful and 
offensive.  However … offensive ideas are not sufficient to ground a justification 
for infringing on freedom of expression. 
 
… There may be circumstances where expression that “ridicules” members of a 
protected group goes beyond humour or satire and risks exposing the person to 
detestation and vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.  In such circumstances, however, the risk results from the intensity 
of the ridicule reaching a level where the target becomes exposed to hatred.   
 
If New Zealand were to follow Canada’s lead on applying a restrictive interpretation of 
hate speech, it therefore seems likely that almost all humour and satire would continue 
to be free expression within the law. 
 
4 Alternatives to civil legislation 
 
a) Marketplace of ideas 
 
One of the main alternatives offered is a ‘marketplace of ideas’, where all speech goes 
untrammelled and false, offensive or harmful speech can be countered and essentially 
shouted down by other ideas. As Laura Beth Nielsen recognises, “many legal scholars 
advocate unfettered free speech, claiming that individuals who are offended or harmed 
by speech can (and should) counter these bad effects with various kinds of ‘more 
speech’.”154 She identifies that “consumers of ideas are expected to reject the bad ones, 
insert the better ones, and eventually prevail.”
155
 However, Nielsen criticises this 
concept on the basis that it is “typically vague” and asks “what kind of speech 
effectively counters the ‘truth’ of a racial epithet or a sexual slur?”156 Nielsen conducted 
                                                
152 Advertising Standards Authority Complaint Number 13/184 (15 May 2013). 
153 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [90]-[91]. 
154 Laura Beth Nielsen “Power in Public: Reactions, Responses, and Resistance to Offensive Public 
Speech” in Speech and Harm, above n 94, at 148. 
155 At 154.  
156 At 154-155. 
Vanessa Haggie LAWS 582 2013 301016435 
34 
 
interviews with subjects and found that many reported unwillingness to respond to hate 
speech due to being fearful for their safety; those who were willing to engage were 
predominately white men “less likely to be physically vulnerable.”157 This indicates that 
for minorities, relying on a marketplace of ideas where the best response to hate speech 
is more speech, may not be appropriate or adequate to protect them from exposure to 
hatred. 
 
The court in Whatcott also discussed the marketplace of ideas as an alternative:158 
 
I do not say that the marketplace of ideas may not be a reasonable alternative, and 
where a legislature is so minded, it will not enact hate speech 
legislation.  However, in Keegstra, Dickson CJ set out a compelling rationale for 
why Parliament’s preference to regulate hate speech through legislation rather than 
to trust it to the hands of the marketplace was also reasonable.  He noted that ‘the 
state should not be the sole arbiter of truth, but neither should we overplay the view 
that rationality will overcome all falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of 
ideas’ … While hate speech may achieve the self-fulfillment of the publisher, it 
does so by reducing the participation and self-fulfillment of individuals within the 
vulnerable group. These drawbacks suggest that this alternative is not without its 
concerns. 
 
Nielsen’s and Takach’s research both indicate that the ‘marketplace’ is not safe for 
minorities to respond adequately to hate speech. Furthermore, as the court in Whatcott 
recognised, hate speech does not necessarily result in the ‘search for truth’ that the 
marketplace of ideas aims to nurture. 
 
b) Subsidised marketplace of ideas 
 
In response to the viewpoint that hate speech prevents minorities from responding to 
“speech which they find marginalizing or disempowering” Katharine Gelber has 
developed a policy proposal which she phrases as 'speaking back'.159 She characterises 
this proposal as one in which:160  
 
[I]ndividuals who are the targets of hate speech are provided with the institutional, 
educational, and material support to enable them to speak back, both to counteract 
                                                
157 At 159.  
158 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission, above n 60, at [104], quoting Dickson CJ R v 
Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697 at 763. 
159 Katharine Gelber “‘Speaking Back’: The Likely Fate of Hate Speech Policy in the United States and 
Australia” in Speech and Harm, above n 94, at 51. 
160 Above. 
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the messages contained within the hate speech and to counteract the effects of that 
speech on their ability to respond. 
 
Gelber sees the outcome as shifting and recontextualising the hate speech policy debate, 
one which no longer binarily pits the speech opportunities of the hate speaker against 
the interests of the minority target.161 While she recognises that it does not directly 
punish the hate speaker, it “might do more to assist the targets” and aims to 
“[ameliorate] the effects of hate speech in such a way that the targets themselves are 
better able to engage in speech.”162 One of her key arguments in favour of such a policy 
is that it is not “speech-limiting or speech-restricting, it is speech-enhancing.”163  
 
In analysing her proposed policy in the United States context, Gelber recognises that 
although ‘speaking back’ is speech-enhancing rather than speech-limiting, and could 
“promote and assist respectful interaction between human beings,”164 it may still be 
considered constitutionally invalid:165  
 
[T]he idea that the speech of those who are disproportionately unable to speak 
might be supported to do so (even if it is in a way that does not restrict other 
speakers) has also been rejected by the Supreme Court. 
 
Gelber attempts to construct ways in which the 'speaking back' policy could retain 
compatibility with First Amendment law, but ultimately recognises that for legal and 
'political-pragmatic' reasons, the likelihood of such a programme to be achieved in the 
United States is “relatively bleak.”166 
 
In contrast, such a policy in New Zealand would likely be considered legally valid and 
justified as a measure taken “in good faith” under s 19(2) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
With that said, Gelber's consideration of 'political-pragmatic' reasons equally apply 
within the New Zealand context. She recognises that it “would require an allocation of 
public funds to the furtherance of specific anti-discriminatory messages in a manner 
which reaches beyond the historical or current commitments of many governments.”
167
 
While the New Zealand government provides funds for furtherance of human rights and 
anti-discrimination, such as funding the Human Rights Commission, it is doubtful that it 
would dedicate funding to this type of programme, especially as the proposal is aimed at 
                                                
161 Above. 
162 At 52. 
163 At 55. 
164 At 59. 
165 At 56. 
166 At 62-63. 
167 At 62. 
Vanessa Haggie LAWS 582 2013 301016435 
36 
 
providing assistance to “the individual target who experiences an incident of hate 
speech” rather than being framed as a general educational programme. 
 
Gelber's proposal is also troubling in that it puts the onus on the minority victim of hate 
speech to avail themselves of the government support in publicly speaking back. While 
this would also be true to some extent where a victim can complain to a human rights 
agency, in the latter situation once a complaint is made the agency takes on the 
investigative and prosecutorial role. Gelber stresses that her policy aims to allow 
victims to “become able to respond by contradicting the messages … and counteracting 
its effects.”168 What she fails to recognise is that in an environment saturated with 
residue of legalised and legislated hate speech against minorities, requiring a minority 
victim to individually speak out may well be easier said than done. As Waldron 
identifies:169 
 
Why can't government presume that people's sense of the place of minorities in 
social life is resilient, even in the face of a proliferation of hateful material 
proclaiming the opposite? … [T]he question answers itself, particularly in the 
context of a society that has a history of racism or intercommunal conflict. Nobody 
knows when that heritage of hate and conflict is really over. 
 
While Waldron addresses the issue from the perspective of racial minorities, his 
comment is equally valid in the context of gender and sexual minorities. Homosexuality 
was only legalised in New Zealand in 1986, less than thirty years ago.
170
  Although the 
Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act was passed earlier in 2013, it faced 
ferocious opposition from some quarters of society. Transgender individuals continue to 
face even more prejudice. Many prefer to keep their gender status private or shared only 
with those they implicitly trust, in order to avoid facing such prejudice and stigma. A 
GSM individual may feel confident and comfortable coming forward to take advantage 
of a ‘speak out’ funding programme, but equally, many would far rather stay silent than 
‘out’ themselves publically. To protect vulnerable minorities, it is simply not enough to 
require them to speak out on their own behalf. 
 
c)  Criminalising hate speech 
 
Some commentators suggest that “to minimally impair expression, hate speech should 
be dealt with through criminal law prohibitions or other prohibitions restricting only 
                                                
168 At 69. 
169 Waldron, above n 92, at 153. 
170 Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986. 
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speech which threatens, advocates or justifies violence.”
171
 However, as the Court in 
Whatcott noted:172 
 
The Commission argues that the Criminal Code provisions regulate only the most 
extreme forms of hate speech, advocating genocide or inciting a “breach of the 
peace”.  In contrast, human rights legislation “provides accessible and inexpensive 
access to justice” for disadvantaged victims to assert their right to dignity and 
equality. 
 
If the amendments I have proposed were enacted, New Zealand law would maintain 
both criminal and civil hate speech legislation. However, s 131 aims to punish only the 
most egregious forms of hate speech. The requirement of intent, combined with the 
requirement for consent to prosecute from the Attorney-General, means that in practice 
the majority of hate speech will go unpunished. Civil provisions allowing investigation 
by the Human Rights Review Tribunal will provide more accessible justice for most 
complaints. Additionally, civil penalties are less punitive than fines and/or 
imprisonment. They emphasise conciliation and understanding between parties rather 
than legal punishment. 
 
IV Conclusion 
 
While hate speech legislation does create a conflict with freedom of expression, it is a 
conflict that can be justified and harmonised unless the constitutional framework is that 
in which free speech is paramount and cannot be balanced against other rights and 
freedoms. Any provision concerning hate speech must avoid overreaching into the realm 
of free expression. As a result, ‘hate speech’ should be clearly defined and narrowly 
focussed in scope, as words or matter which “exposes or tends to expose to hatred or 
contempt” the minority group at which the protection is aimed. In New Zealand’s 
constitutional/rights framework, this limitation on freedom of expression can be 
justified as reasonable and appropriate. Although other options are available, none 
protect the minority group in question to the extent that hate speech limiting provisions 
would do so.  
 
Furthermore, as the court in Whatcott recognised:173  
 
Hate speech undermines the principles upon which freedom of expression is based 
and ‘contributes little to the […] quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-
                                                
171 Whatcott v Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, above n 60, at [105]. 
172 Above. 
173 At [104], quoting Dickson CJ in R v Keegstra, above n 158, at 766. 
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development or the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy where the 
participation of all individuals is accepted and encouraged.’ 
 
To protect low-value speech which contributes so little, at the risk of perpetuating harm, 
discrimination, marginalisation and silencing of vulnerable minorities, is not 
appropriate. It sends the message that the voice of hate speakers is worth more than that 
of minorities, and undermines the implicit assurance that those minorities are welcome 
in and a valuable part of our society.  
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